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1THE BTWC PROTOCOL:
IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III OF THE CONVENTION:
PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
by Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.  Briefing Papers No. 121 and 132 in October 1998 provided some building blocks for
consideration in respect of the provisions relating to Article III of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) in the Protocol being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group.  Those
two Briefing Papers examined some of the current national export controls and regulations
for transfers of hazard materials and the international initiatives that are ongoing to strengthen
these around the world.    It was noted that there is an increasing awareness world-wide, both
from security considerations and from public health and environmental concerns, of the need
to control the use, storage and transfer of  hazardous materials. Those Briefing Papers were
intended as building blocks which might be considered from a point of view of strengthening
the BTWC as well as contributing to the implementation of Article III of the BTWC.
23. The consideration of provisions in the Protocol for the implementation of Article III of
the Convention was taken forward by Briefing Paper No. 283 in January 2000 which
considered the undertakings placed on States Parties in Article III and took note of the
relevant language in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference.   Attention was
then given to the development of the provisions in the draft Protocol relating to Article III of
the Convention and consideration given to the objectives that should be sought in
strengthening the BTWC through improved implementation of Article III.   The transfer
regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which includes controls of two
toxins, was analysed and then the emerging Protocol transfer regime compared with the CWC
regime to identify possible developments in the Protocol provisions for improving the
implementation of Article III of the Convention.
3.  As it is clear from the statements made during the November/December 2000 Ad Hoc
Group session that there will be a concerted effort by all States Parties to complete the
Protocol this year prior to the Fifth Review Conference in November/December 2001, it is
timely to give some pragmatic consideration to how to resolve this sensitive and emotive
issue of improving the implementation of Article III of the Convention.  This Briefing Paper
starts by recalling the undertakings placed on States Parties in Article III of the Convention
and the agreed language adopted in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in
1996.  The Article III obligations are then considered in the context of the international
regimes of today -- the 21st Century -- that are increasingly being adopted to control
hazardous dual purpose materials.   Some pragmatic considerations are then made in respect
                                                
1Graham S. Pearson, Article III : Some Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 12, University of Bradford,
October 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2Graham S. Pearson, Article III : Further Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 13, University of Bradford,
October 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
3Graham S. Pearson, The BTWC Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention,
Briefing Paper No. 28, University of Bradford,  January 2000.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2of how the Protocol might promote the improved implementation of Article III of the
Convention thereby bringing benefits to all States Parties.
Article III of the Convention
4.  Article III of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)4 states that:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified
in Article I of the Convention.
5.  The Final Declaration5 of the Fourth Review Conference of the BTWC held on 25
November to 6 December 1996 stated in respect of Article III that:
"The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes the statements
which States that have acceded to the Convention have made to the effect that they
have not transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery,
specified in Article I of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not
furnished assistance, encouragement, or inducement to any State, group of States or
international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.  The
Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any
recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational levels.
The Conference notes that a number of States Parties stated that they have already
taken concrete measures to give effect to their undertakings under this Article, and in
this context also notes statements made by States Parties at the Conference about the
legislative or administrative measures they have taken since the Third Review
Conference.   The Conference calls for appropriate measures by all States Parties.
Transfers relevant to the Convention should be authorized only when the intended
use is for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.   
The Conference discussed the question whether multilaterally-agreed guidelines or
multilateral guidelines negotiated by all States Parties to the Convention concerning
the transfer of biological agents, materials and technology for peaceful purposes for
any purpose whatsoever might strengthen the Convention.   In the development of
implementation of Article III, the Conference notes that States Parties should also
consider ways and means to ensure that individuals or subnational groups are
effectively prevented from acquiring, through transfers, biological agents and
toxins for other than peaceful purposes.   The Conference notes that these issues
are being considered as part of the ongoing process of strengthening the
Convention.
                                                
4United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Sixth Session, 2826 (XXVI), 16 December 1971.
5United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction,  Geneva 25 November - 6 December 1996, Final Report, BWC/CONF.IV/9,  Geneva, 1996.
3The Conference reiterates that the provisions of this Article should not be used to
impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfers for purposes consistent with
the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge,
technology, equipment and materials under Article X." [Emphasis added]
It is to be noted that the third paragraph above from the Fourth Review Conference Final
Declaration replaced the single sentence in the Third Review Conference Final Declaration6
which stated simply that:
"The implementation of this Article with respect to such transfers should continue to
be the subject of multilateral consideration."
6.  The expanded consideration by the Fourth Review Conference reflected both the ongoing
consideration by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) addressing measures to strengthen the
effectiveness and the implementation of the Convention and the concern expressed by the G7
Heads of State and Government in June 1996 in their declaration on terrorism7 when they
stated that "Special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, biological
and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes."
International Control Regimes
7.  Consideration by the Ad Hoc Group of how to improve the implementation of Article III
of the Convention has been an emotive and sensitive topic with the expression of extreme
views ranging from the idea that there should be no provisions relating to Article III in the
Protocol in contravention of the mandate to improve the implementation of the Convention to,
at the other extreme, the idea that there should be instantaneous dismantling of all current
export control regimes which is quite unrealistic.  It has to be recognised that the BTWC
Protocol is not being negotiated in isolation without any regard to the wider international,
regional and national scene nor is it being negotiated in a frozen time capsule set at some time
in the past.  This wider scene needs to be borne in mind when considering what measures to
improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention are appropriate for the Protocol
and what are not.
8.  It is evident that all States are living in an increasingly controlled world and that the public
in every country is demanding such controls to protect their health and environment, their
prosperity and their well being.   As standards of living improve in all countries, people
expect – and rightly so – to be protected from dangerous materials and not exposed needlessly
to avoidable risks and dangers.  The past 50 years has seen immense advances in health,
welfare and prosperity around the world – and yet further improvements are demanded by the
public.   There is no going back to a more dangerous, less safe uncontrolled world.  This is
clearly shown by the intense reactions to risks to public health and safety in Europe from the
emergence of BSE in cattle and CJD in humans and in South Africa to the incidence of
HIV/AIDS.
                                                
6United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, Final Report, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
7United Nations, Letter dated 5 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General,  A/51/208, S/1996/543, 12 July 1996.
49.  There seems to be a tendency when considering possible measures in the Protocol to
improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention for the States Parties in the Ad
Hoc Group to regard the comparable CWC provisions as in some way as being the norm or
the baseline and forgetting that the world has moved forward considerably over the past
decade since the comparable CWC provisions were being finalized.   Ten years ago the
Persian Gulf War had just commenced and there was no certain knowledge of the size and
extent of the Iraqi biological weapons programme or that such weapons had been deployed by
Iraq with predelegated authority to use them.8   There had been no admission by President
Yeltsin that the former Soviet Union, despite being a co-depositary of the BTWC, had
continued an offensive biological weapons programme until 1992.  There was also no
knowledge that a religious sect in Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo, was seeking both chemical and
biological weapons and was going to try to disseminate both types of weapon against the
public of Tokyo.   Although there was growing international concern especially in developing
countries about dangerous chemicals, no longer being regarded as acceptable or safe in
developed countries, being supplied to those countries and about damage to the environment
and the loss of natural resources, there had been no Earth Summit in Rio with its adoption in
1992 of Agenda 21 and its Principles and the Convention on Biological Diversity with its
provisions for biosafety and the negotiation of a biosafety protocol to address transborder
movements of genetically-modified organisms had not yet been opened for signature. It is
necessary to examine the developments over the past decade and to pay particular attention to
the increasing control of dual-use materials seeking to foster their permitted use whilst
preventing their misuse for prohibited purposes.
10. Developments are outlined briefly for the following dual-use material regimes:
a. Chemical weapon agents and precursors;
b. Banned and severely restricted chemicals;
c. Pathogens and genetically-modified organisms;
d. Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and
e. Chemical and biological terrorism preparedness,
Before considering pragmatically how the Protocol might promote the improvement of
Article III of the BTWC.
Chemical Weapon Agents and Precursors
11.   The past decade has seen a big step forward.  In 1991, the CWC had not completed its
negotiation and the only international prohibition was the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which
prohibited the use of both chemical and biological weapons.   The Iraq/Iran war of the 1980s
had seen a steady increase in the use of chemical weapons with little international action
other than the emergence of a group of like-minded States who decided to harmonize their
national controls of the exports of chemical warfare agents and their precursors in order to
constrain the trade in such materials.9  It seems to be forgotten now that this action preceded
the completion of the CWC and was in advance of its time.
                                                
8 Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation, Macmillan/
St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
9 Further information on the Australia Group is provided in Graham S. Pearson, Article III : Some Building
Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 12, University of Bradford,  October 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc
512.  The CWC was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.  This places
an obligation on all States Parties to undertake never under any circumstances…to…transfer,
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone and goes on to require each State Party to
adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only …
transferred … for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. 10  The transfer regimes
specified in the CWC for scheduled chemicals are summarised in the Table.
Chemicals Transfers within State
 Party
Transfer to other States
Parties
Transfers to States not
party to the Convention
Schedule 1 Detailed annual
 declarations
Notification 30 days
before transfer
Prohibited
Detailed annual
declarations
Retransfer prohibited
Schedule 2 Annual declaration of sale
or transfer within State
Aggregate national data of
quantities imported and
exported
Prohibited three years
after entry into force of
the Convention
Annual declaration of
direct export
End-use certificate during
interim period
Retransfer prohibited
Schedule 3 Aggregate national data of
quantities imported and
exported
End-use certificate
Retransfer prohibited
Review five years after
entry into force of
Convention
It should be recalled that Schedule 1 includes two toxins, saxitoxin and ricin.
13.  In the analysis of the CWC in Briefing Paper No. 28, it was noted that the regime under
the OPCW relating to the transfer of scheduled chemicals was having a significant effect both
on States Parties and on States not yet party to the CWC.   Furthermore, the Director
General's statement to the General Assembly in October 1999 that these present trade
provisions, including additional restrictions which will come into force very soon, will
inexorably impact on the import of certain fundamental chemicals by States which are not
party to the Convention, makes it evident that the forthcoming review of the Schedule 3
chemicals regime is likely to see this strengthened.   Although in the fourth year of the
implementation of the CWC, it is evident from the statement11 of the Director-General to the
Fifth Conference of States Parties on 15 May 2000 that there are continuing uncertainties
about transfers of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals the Director-General emphasised that:
                                                
10 Further information on these provisions of the CWC are provided in Graham S. Pearson, The BTWC
Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention, Briefing Paper No. 28, University of
Bradford,  January 2000.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
11 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the
Conference of the States Parties at its Fifth Session, Conference of the States Parties, C-V/DG.11, 15 May 2000.
6 Clarity about the quantities of such chemicals transferred among States Parties is a
sine qua non for confidence that all of the transfer obligations under the Convention
are being scrupulously adhered to.
It is evident that over time, the OPCW regime will build confidence between States Parties to
the CWC that chemicals are not being misused for purposes prohibited under that
Convention.
14.  Although it is noted that the CWC in Article XI Economic and Technological
Development includes the following provision:
2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without prejudice to the principles
and applicable rules of international law, the States Parties shall:...
(e) Undertake to review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in
chemicals in order to render them consistent with the object and purpose of this
Convention.
the Director-General’s statement in May 2000 makes it clear that there is still some way to go
before there is clarity in regard to data on transfers between States Parties and it is therefore
premature to review existing national regulations other than to ensure that they are consistent
with the requirements of the Convention and the new obligations effective on 29 April 2000
in regard to non-transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to non-States Parties.
Banned and Severely Restricted Chemicals
15.   As noted in Briefing Paper No. 1312, there has long been encouragement that
Governments should take steps to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals, which are
unacceptable for domestic purposes in the exporting country, are not permitted to be exported
without the knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities in the importing country.
This led to a consolidated UN list of banned and severely restricted chemicals which were
defined13 as:
Banned - A product that has been prohibited for all uses nationally in one or more
countries by final government regulatory action because of health or environmental
reasons
Withdrawn - A product formerly in commerce that has been withdrawn for all uses
nationally in one or more countries by final voluntary action of the manufacturer
because of health or environmental reasons
Severely restricted - A product for which virtually all uses have been prohibited
nationally in one or more countries by final government regulatory action because of
health or environmental reasons, but for which certain specific uses remain
authorized
                                                
12Graham S. Pearson, Article III : Further Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 13, University of Bradford,
October 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
13 United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Consolidated List of Products
Whose Consumption and/or Sale Have Been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or not Approved by
Governments, Fourth Edition, United Nations, New York, 1991.
7The London Guidelines adopted in 1987 led to the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure
which provided a mechanism for importing countries to formally record and disseminate their
decisions regarding the future importation of chemicals which have been banned or severely
restricted in the exporting countries and outlines the shared responsibilities of importing and
exporting countries and exporting industries in ensuring that these decisions are heeded.
Following the Rio Summit of 1992 with its adoption of a set of principles which were
amplified in a series of Chapters which included Chapter 19 to address environmentally
sound management of toxic chemicals, including prevention of illegal international traffic in
toxic and dangerous products which included in Section C a call for the achievement by 2000
of full participation in and implementation of the PIC procedure, including possible
mandatory applications through legally binding instruments.  Negotiations of the PIC
convention were completed by the adoption in September 1998 of the Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade.
16. The Preamble to the new PIC Convention recognizes that "trade and environmental
policies should be mutually supportive" to achieve sustainable development.   The treaty aims
at protecting "human health, including the health of consumers and workers, and the
environment."   It requires that harmful pesticides and chemicals that have been banned or
severely restricted in at least two countries shall not be exported unless explicitly agreed by
the importing country. Under the treaty, exporting countries will be legally bound to inform
importing countries about exports of chemicals banned or severely restricted in the exporting
country.   This export notification will be required prior to the first export and be repeated for
the first export each year. In developing countries and countries in transition, technical
assistance shall be promoted for the development of the infrastructure and the capacity
necessary to manage chemicals.
17.    The PIC Convention contains provisions for the exchange of information  among
Parties and provides for a national decision-making process  regarding import and
compliance by exporters with these decisions.   The provisions regarding information
exchange include:
* The requirement for a Party to inform other Parties of each ban or severe restriction
on a chemical it implements nationally;
* The possibility for a developing country Party or a Party with an economy in
transition to inform other Parties that it is experiencing problems caused by a severely
hazardous pesticide formulation under conditions of use in its territory;
* The requirement for a Party that plans to export a chemical that is banned or
severely restricted for use within its territory, to inform the importing Party that such
export will take place, before the first shipment and annually thereafter;
* The requirement that an exporting Party, when exporting chemicals that are to be
used for occupational purposes, shall ensure that a safety data sheet that follows an
internationally recognized format, setting out the most up-to-date information
available, is sent to the importer;
* The requirement that exports of chemicals included in the PIC procedure and other
chemicals that are banned or severely restricted domestically, when exported, are
8subject to labelling requirements that ensure adequate availability of information with
regard to risks and/or hazards to human health or the environment.
Decisions taken by the importing Party must be trade neutral; that is, if the Party decides it
does not consent to accepting imports of a specific chemical, it must also stop domestic
production of the chemical for domestic use or imports from any non-party.
Pathogens and Genetically-modified Organisms
18. There has long been an awareness that pathogens if not subject to appropriate control and
stored in appropriate containment may be released and cause outbreaks of disease.
Consequently, nations have adopted regulations governing the storage, containment and
handling of those pathogens that present the greatest danger should an accidental release
occur.   These controls have been harmonized regionally and internationally to protect public
health.  Similar controls are also applied for animal and plant pathogens. The Rio Summit in
1992 also saw attention being devoted to the promotion of biosafety through the Chapter 16
Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnology which included the following:
"there is a need for further development of internationally agreed principles of risk
assessment and management of all aspects of biotechnology, which should build upon
those developed at the national level.   Only when adequate and transparent safety and
border-control procedures are in place will the community at large be able to derive
maximum benefit from, and be in a much better position to accept the potential benefits
and risks of, biotechnology." [Emphasis added].
The desirability of trans-border controls was echoed in the legally binding Convention for
Biological Diversity14 which opened for signature at Rio in 1992 and entered into force in
December 1993.   Paragraph 3 of Article 19 on Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution
of its Benefits states that:
"The Parties shall consider the need for an modalities of a protocol setting out
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting
from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity." [Emphasis added
19. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol was agreed in January 2000 including an Advance
Informed Agreement procedure for the transborder control of genetically modified organisms.
This requires the provision of the following information prior to the first transborder
movement of the organisms:
(a) Name, address and contact details of the exporter.
(b) Name, address and contact details of the importer.
(c) Name and identity of the living modified organism, as well as the domestic
classification, if any, of the biosafety level of the living modified organism in the State
of export.
(d) Intended date or dates of the transboundary movement, if known.
                                                
14 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro 5 June 1992, HMSO, Cm 2127,
January 1993.   Also available as United Nations, UNEP/CBD/94/1, Geneva, November 1994.
9(e) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of recipient organism or parental organisms related to biosafety.
(f) Centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity, if known, of the recipient
organism and/or the parental organisms and a description of the habitats where the
organisms may persist or proliferate.
(g) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of the donor organism or organisms related to biosafety.
(h) Description of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced, the technique used,
and the resulting characteristics of the living modified organism.
(i) Intended use of the living modified organism or products thereof, namely, processed
materials that are of living modified organism origin, containing detectable novel
combinations of replicable genetic material obtained through the use of modern
biotechnology.
(j) Quantity or volume of the living modified organism to be transferred.
(k) A previous and existing risk assessment report consistent with Annex III† .
(l) Suggested methods for the safe handling, storage, transport and use, including
packaging, labelling, documentation, disposal and contingency procedures, where
appropriate.
(m) Regulatory status of the living modified organism within the State of export (for
example, whether it is prohibited in the State of export, whether there are other
restrictions, or whether it has been approved for general release) and, if the living
modified organism is banned in the State of export, the reason or reasons for the ban.
(n) Result and purpose of any notification by the exporter to other States regarding the
living modified organism to be transferred.
(o) A declaration that the above-mentioned information is factually correct.
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
20. Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have characteristics that fall into the region
between biological and chemical weapons as many are chemicals yet are the product of living
materials or plants.  There have long been international treaties to limit the cultivation,
production, manufacture and use of these dual purpose materials to an adequate amount
required for scientific and medical purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and
manufacture of, and illicit traffic in and use of, such drugs.  There are three principal
Conventions – the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs15 controlling 118 drugs, the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances16 controlling 111 such substances and the 1988
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances17 which
introduces controls on 22 precursors and essential chemicals. The number of States Parties to
all three of these Conventions is currently close to 160 and it is clear that States Parties are
introducing controls as required by the Conventions on the export and import of these
materials.
                                                
† Annex III Risk Assessment  of the Biosafety Protocol sets out the general principles, methodology and points to
consider in carrying out a risk assessment.
15Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and the Protocol of 25 March 1972 amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.  Available at http://www.incb.org/e/conv/menu.htm
16 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971. Available at http://www.incb.org/e/conv/menu.htm
17 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.
Available at http://www.incb.org/e/conv/menu.htm
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21.  The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires States Parties to submit annual
statistical returns including information on annual imports and exports of drugs.  This
information is then collated and provided in tables showing the world trade stating the
quantities exported and imported between the named principal exporting and importing
countries for fourteen of the drugs listed in the Convention.  The 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances controls and monitors exports and imports of psychotropic
substances listed in the Schedules to that Convention.  In addition, States Parties may prohibit
imports into its country of one or more of the specific substances listed in certain Schedules;
a listing is published indicating which specific substances have been prohibited from import
into which country.   Annual assessments of the domestic and scientific requirements in
grams for the psychotropic substances in Schedules II, III and IV of the 1971 Convention are
also prepared by the States Parties.  These are published18 to assist the national authorities of
the exporting countries in determining whether a requested import appears to be excessive in
comparison to a reported annual requirement for that country.  If this were to be the case, the
export should be denied until the designated national authorities of the importing country
confirm the legitimacy of the import request and authenticate the import documents.
22.  The 1988 Convention requires the monitoring of international trade in certain precursors
and essential chemicals specified in Tables I and II of the Convention and the provision of
information prior to the export of substances specified in Table I.   The latest annual report19
of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reported that about 90% of Governments
have provided details in their annual statistical reports on the country of origin of imports and
the countries of destination for all psychotropic substances.  The INCB supplementary
report20 on the implementation of the 1988 Convention notes that the number of
Governments that send pre-export notices or inquiries concerning the legitimacy of individual
transactions of precursors or essential chemicals specified in Table I and II of the 1988
Convention continues to grow and, more recently, the INCB noted with satisfaction that an
increasing number of authorities in major trans-shipment points are sending such pre-export
notices.  Such pre-export notices enable the competent authorities of importing countries to
verify the legitimacy of these transactions and to identify suspicious shipments, thus
preventing diversions.   The chemicals in Tables I and II are quite common ones – they
include hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid as well as acetic anhydride and potassium
permanganate.  Their illicit use is a very small percentage – often much less than 1 per cent –
of their legal use.
Chemical and Biological Terrorism Preparedness
23.  There has been much international attention given to preparedness against the possibility
that terrorists may seek to use chemical or biological weapons since the use by the Aum
Shinrikyo sect in Japan of sarin in attacks in the Tokyo subway in March 1995.  It has also
become evident that the Aum Shinrikyo sect had also attempted to use biological weapons
but without success.  The G8 Heads of State and Government have continued to stress the
importance of fighting terrorism.
                                                
18International Narcotics Control Board, Assessments of Annual Domestic Medical and Scientific Requirements
for Substances Listed in Schedules II, III and IV of the 1971 Convention  on Psychotropic Substances,
E/INCB/PSY/C.L.20/2000, Annex, 1 October 2000.  Available at http://www.incb.org/e/estim/menu.htm
19 International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Board for 1999,
E/INCB/1999/1, 23 February 2000.  Available at http://www.incb.org
20 International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Board for 1999 on the
implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988, E/INCB/1999/4, New York, 2000.  Available at http://www.incb.org
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24.  In Briefing Paper No 721 in March 1998, an overview was provided of the national regulations
in the UK, the EEC and in the United States as well as some other countries in respect of micro-
organisms with the aim of providing some further building blocks to be considered in the
strengthening of the BTWC and the implementation of Article X of the Convention.  This
overview included information US legislation which had been introduced to counter biological
terrorism in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199622  which included in
Section 511 Enhanced Penalties and Control of Biological Agents.   This states that "the
Congress finds that:
(1) Certain biological agents have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health
and safety;
(2) Such biological agents can be used as weapons by individuals or organizations for the
purpose of domestic or international terrorism or for other criminal purposes;
(3) The transfer and possession of potentially hazardous biological agents should be
regulated to protect public health and safety; and
(4) Efforts to protect the public from exposure to such agents should ensure that
individuals and groups with legitimate objectives continue to have access to such agents
for clinical and research purposes."
It sets out the requirement that the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
"establish and maintain a list of each biological agent that has the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety"
In addition to ensure the regulation of transfers of listed biological agents, "the Secretary
shall, through regulations...provide for:
(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the transfer of
biological agents listed .... including measures to ensure -
(A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such agents; and
(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents;
(2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for use in domestic or international
terrorism or for any other criminal purpose;
(3)  the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety in the event of a transfer
or potential transfer of a biological agent in violation of the safety procedures established
under paragraph (1) or the safeguards established under paragraph (2); and.
(4) appropriate availability of biological agents for research, education and other
legitimate purposes."
25.   On 10 June 1996, the proposed rules23 to achieve the above requirements were promulgated
in the Federal Register inviting written comments before 10 July 1996 on the proposed rules.   The
proposed rule was designed to:
                                                
21Graham S. Pearson, Article X :  Further Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 7, University of Bradford,
March 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
22United States, Public Law 104-132, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 24 April 1996.
23United States, Federal Register, Department of Health and Human Services, Additional Requirements for
Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Infectious Agents, Proposed Rules, Volume 61, No. 112, Monday 10
June 1996, 29327 - 29333.
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* Establish a system of safeguards to be followed when specific agents are transported;
* Collect and provide information concerning the location where certain potentially 
hazardous agents are transferred
* Track the acquisition and transfer of these specific agents; and
* Establish a process for alerting the authorities if an unauthorized attempt is made
to acquire these agents.
26.  The final rule was published in the Federal Register of 24 October 199624 with an
effective date of 15 April 1997;  all transfers of agents must comply with the complete
documentation and registration requirements on or after that date.  The final rule included the
following elements:
Registration of facilities
Request for agents
Verification of registration
Transfer
Inspections
together with in Appendix A the list of select agents which comprises the following:
"Viruses
1.  Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
2.  Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
3.  Ebola viruses
4.  Equine Morbillivirus
5.  Lassa fever virus
6.  Marburg virus
7.  Rift Valley fever virus
8.  South American Haemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal,
Guanarito)
9.  Tick-borne encephalitis complex viruses
10.  Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
11.  Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus
12.  Viruses causing hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
13.  Yellow fever virus
Bacteria
1.  Bacillus anthracis
2.  Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B.suis
3.  Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
4.  Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
5.  Clostridium botulinum
6.  Francisella tularensis
7.  Yersinia pestis
                                                
24United States, Federal Register, Department of Health and Human Services, Additional Requirements for
Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents,  Rules and Regulations, Volume 61, No. 207, Thursday 24
October 1996, 55190 - 55200.
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Rickettsiae
1.  Coxiella burnetii
2.  Rickettsia prowazekii
3.  Rickettsia rickettsii
Fungi
1.  Coccidioides immitis
Toxins
1.  Abrin
2.  Aflatoxins
3.  Botulinum toxins
4.  Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
5.  Conotoxins
6.  Diacetoxyscirpenol
7.  Ricin
8.  Saxitoxin
9.  Shigatoxin
10.  Staphylococcal enterotoxins
11.  Tetrodotoxin
12.  T-2 Toxin
Recombinant Organisms/Molecules
1.  Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements from organisms in
Appendix A, shown to produce or encode for a factor associated with a disease.
2.  Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic
acid sequences coding for any of the toxins listed in this Annex, or their toxic
subunits."
It will be noted that, unsurprisingly, this list contains all the micro-organisms generally
included in lists of possible biological warfare agents.   Consequently, these US rules are of
particular interest when considering measures that might strengthen, or contribute to the
strengthening, of the BTWC.
27.  A request for any of the agents listed above requires the completion, prior to any transfer,
of CDC Form EA-101 for each transfer sought.   The information provided must include:
"(i) The name of the requestor and the requesting facility;
(ii) The name of the transferor and the transferring facility
(iii) The names of responsible facility officials for both the transferor and requestor...
(iv) The requesting facility's registration number;
(v) The transferring facility's registration number;
(vi) The name of the agent(s) being shipped;
(vii) The proposed use of the agent(s); and
(viii) The quantity (number of containers and amount per container) of the agent(s)
being shipped."
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The form must be signed by both the transferor and requestor and by the responsible facility
officials representing both the transferring and receiving facilities.
28.  Prior to transferring any agent, the transferor's responsible facility official must verify
that the requesting facility has a valid registration, that the requestor is an employee of the
requesting facility and that the proposed use of the agent by the requestor is correctly
indicated on form CDC EA-101.
29.  Provisions are also laid down for inspections which state that:
"(1) Registering entities or the Secretary may conduct random or for cause
inspections of registered facilities to assure compliance...  All Forms CDC EA-101
and records deemed relevant by inspecting officials must be produced upon request to
authorized personnel conducting these inspections.  Inspections may also include
review of the mechanisms developed by a facility to track intrafacility transfers as
well as the facility's agent disposal procedures.
(2) In addition, the Secretary may conduct inspections of registering entities and/or
any consolidated database... to assure compliance..."
Overall these rules provide a framework which should ensure that the select agents are only
held in registered and inspected facilities and that all transfers are between registered facilities
and are fully documented and recorded.
30.  Whilst the above controls apply only to facilities within the United States, there would
appear to be a strong logic for extending the provisions to cover adjacent countries such as
Canada and Mexico as otherwise select agents could be exported, without such controls, to a
facility in the adjoining country and then transferred back into the US across the land borders.
Analysis
31. Consideration of the various regimes for dual-use materials outlined above:
a. Chemical Weapon Agents and Precursors
b. Banned and Severely Restricted Chemicals
c. Pathogens and Genetically Modified Organisms
d. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
e. Chemical and Biological Terrorism Preparedness
shows that the monitoring and control of exports and imports in dual-use materials is
becoming the standard as more and more countries around the world want to safeguard the
public health and the environment and thereby promote safety, security and prosperity.  The
trend is increasingly towards more controls over potentially harmful materials to ensure that
these are not misused to cause harm to people or to States.
The Protocol to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
32.  It is appropriate to now consider the Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention against this background of a world in which the trend is towards more
monitoring and control of dual use materials as these bring benefits to all as it is increasingly
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being realized that misuse of such materials in one country can often have effects beyond its
borders in neighbouring countries and more widely.    It is recognized that consideration in
the Ad Hoc Group of how to improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention has
been a particularly difficult issue.   However, this consideration cannot be further deferred as
the development of the remainder of the Protocol is now well advanced and there is a
growing expectation that the Protocol negotiation should indeed be completed this year
before the Fifth Review Conference in November/December 2001.  It is time to give some
pragmatic consideration to what might be done to take the issue forward.
33.  There are those who argue that the Protocol should not address the improvement of the
implementation of Article III of the Convention.  This argument is illogical as it is contrary to
the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the implementation of the Convention.  It would be strange to be highly selective and
discriminatory in deciding which Articles of the Convention should be considered for
improved implementation.  It would also be contrary to the repeated concerns expressed by
States Parties about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and thus of the need to
strengthen the regimes to counter such proliferation – and thus to strengthen the
implementation of Article III.  It is simply not an option for the Protocol to ignore measures
to improve the implementation of Article III.
34.  Others argue that when the Protocol is agreed, all existing export controls on biological
agents and equipment should be removed between States Parties.  This is quite unrealistic as
the agreement of the Protocol is but a first step along the road of increasing transparency and
building confidence between States Parties.   It is, however, true that implementation of the
Protocol in all its aspects will start to improve transparency and enhance confidence between
States Parties.  Over time, States Parties will gain greater confidence that other States Parties
are in compliance with the Convention and the Protocol.  But this will take time – several
years – as implementation of the Protocol and the functioning of the future Organization will
depend on States Parties taking the necessary national steps.  Confidence in compliance will
not happen instantly.   It is also true that over time, States Parties will gain confidence that
other States Parties are in compliance and transfers are less likely to be denied.
35.  It was argued in Briefing Paper No. 2825 that for transfers to be made, the exporting State
Party will need to have confidence that the transfer to a State Party to the Protocol is:
a.  only being used for permitted purposes;
b.  not being retransferred, without approval, to another facility within the receiving
State Party; or
c.  not being retransferred, without approval, to another State Party to the Protocol.
There are thus three requirements.   First, that there should be transparency as to what the
transferred materials and equipment are being used for.  Secondly, there should be national
internal controls on the facilities within a State Party to the Protocol in which particular
agents are handled and on transfers between such facilities.   Thirdly, there should be
national controls of interstate transfers from the State Party to the Protocol to other States
Parties.
                                                
25Graham S. Pearson, The BTWC Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention,
Briefing Paper No. 28, University of Bradford,  January 2000.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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36.  The question is how far should the Protocol try to go along this road of creating an
environment in which States Parties can gain confidence that a transfer is not being misused.
It is useful to consider what the likely eventual situation will be in respect of biological agents
and equipment.  Taking the wider scene into consideration, it is evident that the trend is
increasingly – whether chemicals, biological organisms or drugs and psychochemicals are
concerned – towards a world in which governments want to be consulted prior to potentially
dangerous dual use materials and equipment being introduced into their country and the
exporting governments equally want to be assured that the export is for legitimate purposes
and is not going to be misused.   The psychochemical regime in which States estimate their
annual domestic requirements which are then published to enable exporting countries to
consider requested imports against such estimates and to seek confirmation of the legitimacy
of the request from the importing country as appropriate is an interesting concept as a first
step towards a more rigorous regime.  It is probable that some 20 to 25 years hence it would
be regarded as irresponsible to transfer potentially dangerous dual use materials and
equipment without first receiving confirmation from the importing country that the transfer is
for legitimate purposes.  Such a situation would certainly meet the obligations placed on
States Parties under Article III of the BTWC.
37.   Some States Parties to the BTWC have already taken steps to implement controls on
transfers of biological materials and equipment that seek to prevent transfers should there be
concerns and doubts as to whether the transfers are for legitimate purposes. These States
Parties recognize that such controls enhance both their safety and security and that of the
international community as misuse of biological materials to attack humans, animals or plants
whether by States or by non-State actors will have widespread ramifications and cause harm
to many States. Other States Parties have yet to take such steps.
38. What then is realistic for the Protocol to address in regard to improving the
implementation of Article III of the Convention?  There is insufficient time and the technical
basis is lacking to seek to introduce a tiered regime which parallels that in the CWC for
transfers of Scheduled Chemicals.   It would, however, be sensible to make provision for
some initial controls of transfers of both biological agents and equipment, with a requirement
for States Parties to report to the Organization annually on such  transfers, along with
provisions enabling this transfer regime to be developed by States Parties at the Review
Conferences of the Protocol.   Any concerns relating to transfers could be addressed by States
Parties using the provisions already in the Protocol for consultation, cooperation and
clarification – it is not necessary, and indeed undesirable, to seek to introduce specific
measures to deal with denials of transfers.  The existing provisions in the Protocol in Article
III.E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation will suffice.
39.   Some initial controls in the Protocol of transfers of both biological agents and equipment
would serve as a marker and a requirement for regular Review Conference consideration
would enable the States Parties over time to develop a transfer regime that provides greater
transparency to the State making the transfer of activities in the requesting State and
assurance that the requesting State has indeed the necessary national internal and interstate
controls both in place and being implemented effectively – and thereby increasing the
probability that the requested transfer will take place.
Conclusions
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40.  The issue of how to improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention has
been an emotive and sensitive topic for the Ad Hoc Group.  In a world in which transfers of
dual use materials – whether of chemicals, biological agents or drugs – are increasingly being
monitored and controlled, it is not an option to ignore measures to improve the
implementation of Article III of the Convention.  It is also unrealistic to consider the removal
of such monitoring and controls between States Parties as the trend is the opposite.  However,
under a regime in which there is greater transparency as to what transferred materials are to
be used for and are used for together with assurances that there are the necessary national
internal and interstate controls of transfers, the probability over time will increase that
transfers between States Parties will be made.    A pragmatic approach would be to make
provision for some initial controls of transfers of both biological agents and equipment, with
a requirement for States Parties to report to the Organization annually on such  transfers,
along with provisions enabling this transfer regime to be reviewed and developed by States
Parties at the Review Conferences of the Protocol.
